Issue Short-Lived JWT Tokens with Refresh
Set JWT expiry to 15 minutes and use a refresh token rotation scheme so a stolen access token is useless within a quarter hour.
Task
Implement jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' }) to close a known attack surface before the next security review finds it.
When to use this
A penetration test report flags the missing jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' }) as a medium-severity finding on a public endpoint.
Prerequisites
- A running application with the vulnerable endpoint
- Access to security headers or middleware config
Steps
1. Configure jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' }) in the project configuration file with the recommended defaults.
jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' })
Expected output: The configuration is accepted and jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' }) runs without errors on the first invocation.
2. Run the check locally to verify jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' }) produces the expected result before pushing.
pnpm test
Expected output: Local run matches CI behavior; no surprises after push.
3. Add the gate to the CI pipeline so jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' }) blocks merge on failure.
- name: Run add jwt short lived tokens
run: pnpm test
Expected output: Pull requests with failing jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' }) are blocked from merging.
Troubleshooting
Problem
The check passes locally but fails in CI
Solution
Pin dependency versions and the runtime to match CI exactly; reproduce with the same Docker image or act.
Problem
Configuration is rejected with a schema error
Solution
Check the tool version matches the config schema; older versions may not support newer fields.
Limitations
- The gate only runs on events that trigger the workflow; locally pushed commits bypass it.
- Configuration drift is possible if someone edits settings outside version control.
Close the attack surface
Start by measuring the problem. Set JWT expiry to 15 minutes and use a refresh token rotation scheme so a stolen access token is useless within a quarter hour. The most common mistake is adding the gate without first confirming it catches the issue you care about. Run jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: ‘15m’, algorithm: ‘RS256’ }) against the current codebase and inspect the output before wiring it into CI.
jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m', algorithm: 'RS256' })Verify and monitor
Once the gate is in place, make failures actionable. A failing jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: ‘15m’, algorithm: ‘RS256’ }) should point to the exact file and line, not a generic error. Pin the tool version in the lockfile so a upstream release does not silently change behavior. Review the gate output in every pull request just like a test result.